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Jurimetrics: Science and
Prediction in the Field of Law
The twentieth century has seen the most spectacular ad-
vances in the achievements of science and its products,
as well as in the proliferation of legal rules and prece-
dents. In this Article, Mr. Loevinger discusses the role
that science has played, and is likely to play, in the field
of law. He points up the great potentialities which science
has to offer to the lawyer such as electronics in the field
of data retrieval. He concludes that the lawyer will have
to adapt himself to the evolving and emerging miracles
of man's newest intellectual achievements if the legal pro-
fession is to retain its position of intellectual leadership
in this country.
Lee Loevinger*
Science and law have been linked in man's speech and thinking
for centuries. Indeed, it was quite common for writers of an earlier
era to refer to what they called the "science of law." However, it
may be safely assumed today that anyone who uses such a phrase
seriously does not understand science, whatever he may know of
law. Consideration of the present relationship between law and
science must begin with the recognition that modem science and
contemporary law are separate disciplines which, so far, have
had relatively little influence on one another.
Science, in one sense at least, is as old as the self-conscious hu-
man mind. Whenever man has been engaged in the investigation
of phenomena by observation, measurement and experimentation,
there has been scientific activity. However, science as a separate
and self-conscious discipline is a relatively recent development in
man's history. James Conant has observed that:
As one skims the histories of the natural sciences, it seems clear that
in the embryonic stages of each of the modem disciplines, violent
polemics rather than reasoned opinions often flowed most easily
from the pen .... But if I read the history of science in the Seven-
teenth and Eighteenth centuries rightly, it was only gradually that
*Assistant United States Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United
States Department of Justice.
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there evolved the idea that a scientific investigator must impose on
himself a rigorous self-discipline the moment he enters his laboratory.'
By the end of the nineteenth century, the intellectual movement
which began slowly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
with Copernicus, Vesalius and Galileo had developed into a self-
conscious and integrated discipline calling itself science. It had
produced a substantial body of learning and laid the foundations
for most of the advances in this field that have occurred since
then. The power and achievements of science had by then become
so impressive that they seemed to promise a method of solving
all problems, social and legal, as well as those arising out of the
physical environment.
The great scientist Karl Pearson, writing in 1892, expressed the
spirit of his age when he said:
The classification of facts and the formation of absolute judgments
upon the basis of this classification-judgments independent of the
"idiosyncracies of the individual mind-essentially sum up the aim and
method of modern science. The scientific man has above all things to
strive at self-elimination in his judgments, to provide an argument
which is as true for each individual mind as for his own. The classifi-
cation of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative signifi-
cance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgment
upon these facts unbiased by personal feeling is characteristic of what
may be termed the scientific frame of mind. The scientific method of
examining facts is not peculiar to one class of phenomena and to one
class of workers; it is applicable to social, as well as to physical prob-
lems, and we must carefully guard ourselves against supposing that
the scientific frame of mind is a peculiarity of the professional scien-
tist.2
The same views were expressed by the great lawyer and jurist,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking as early as 1895 when he said:
"An ideal system of law should draw its postulates and its legis-
lative justification from science. As it is now, we rely upon tradi-
tion, or vague sentiment, or the fact that we never thought of any
other way of doing things, as our only warrant for rules which
we enforce with as much confidence as if they embodied revealed
wisdom."3
Holmes reiterated this theme more than once; and he spoke for
a school and a generation of legal realists when he declared: "For
the rational study of the law the black-letter, man may be the
1. CONANT, ON UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 6-7 (1947).
2. PEARSON, THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE 6-7 (1st ed. 1892).
3. HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139(1920).
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man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of sta-
tistics and the master of economics."4
Holmes restated this theme when he said:
The growth of education is an increase in the knowledge of measure.
To use words familiar to logic and to science, it is a substitution of
quantitative for qualitative judgments. ... []n the law we only oc-
casionally can reach an absolutely final and quantitative determination,
because the worth of the competing social ends which respectively so-
licit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant cannot be reduced to
number and accurately fixed. The worth, that is, the intensity of the
competing desires, varies with the varying ideals of the time, and, if
the desires were constant, we could not get beyond a relative decision
that one was greater and one was less. 'But it is of the essence of im-
provement that we should be as accurate as we can ...
I have tried to show by examples something of the interest of science
as applied to the law, and to point out some possible improvement in
our way of approaching practical questions in the same sphere. To
the latter attempt, no doubt, many will hardly be ready to yield me
their assent. But in that event, as in the other, I have had in mind an
ultimate dependence upon science because it is finally for science to
determine, so far as it can, the relative worth of our different social
ends, and, as I have tried to hint, it is our estimate of the proportion
between these, now often blind and unconscious, that leads us to
insist upon and to enlarge the sphere of one principle and to allow
another gradually to dwindle into atrophy. Very likely it may be that
with all the help that statistics and every modem appliance can bring
us there never will be a commonwealth in which science is everywhere
supreme. But it is an ideal, and without ideals what is life worth?5
The twentieth century has seen the most spectacular advances
in the achievements of science and its products, as well as in the
proliferation of legal rules and precedents. If then the foresight of
those who spoke for the nineteenth century was sound, it would be
reasonable to expect that science should by now have made at
least some substantial contributions to the solution of basic legal
problems. However, realism compels the conclusion that science
has contributed little, if anything, to the solution of social or legal
problems. Indeed, it may well have exacerbated latent problems or
even created new ones.
This immediately poses a challenge to seek the reason for this
failure. Has science failed to live up to its promise? Have we failed
to recognize or utilize the answers provided by science? Or was
the insight of earlier thinkers in error, and is science necessarily
4. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187
(1920).
5. HOLMs, Lmv in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 231, 242 (1920).
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concerned only with physical phenomena, and inapplicable to so-
cial fields?
It seems to me that we cannot yet give an unqualified answer
to any of these questions. However, part of the difficulty quite
obviously stems from the fact that we have asked science the
wrong questions, and set it at the wrong tasks. We have expected
science to distill social policies from a test tube or a retort, much
as Aladdin summoned a genie by rubbing a magic lamp. We have
imagined that social scientists could produce tables that would
permit us to read the numerical value of competing interests and
desires much as the mathematicians have produced for us tables
of logarithms, sines and cosines. With the recent advent of elec-
tronic computers, some people now have the impression that we
may be able to produce or construct a machine that will give the
answers to legal questions, or at least give us reasonably accurate
predictions as to the judicial decision of legal issues. All of these
expectations seem unfounded and equally doomed to frustration.
It must be recognized that the term "science" is itself ambiguous
and no more easily defined than is the term "law."6 "Science" may
refer, variously, to accumulated bodies of knowledge on specific
subjects, to the material products of these bodies of knowledge,
to the bodies of professionals who are engaged in research in spe-
cific fields, to specific techniques of research employed by such
professional scientists, or to certain common characteristics of
methodology and conceptualization which are thought to typify
the activities of scientists. It is not important that we should seek
or find some particular definitive meaning for "science." What is
important is that we should be able to examine fields in which
human knowledge and power have been successfully increased and
to borrow from such fields so much as may be adaptable to our
legal and social problems.
When we examine the fields of science from this viewpoint, it
becomes apparent that there are at least two great categories of
work and achievement. In the current jargon, these are known
as the fields of "hardware" and "software." "Hardware" means sim-
ply the mechanical devices-the physical machines-that science
has produced. "Software" means the intellectual systems of de-
signs and concepts that have been produced. Science offers us both
mechanical and intellectual tools. But we must recognize that it of-
fers us nothing more than tools. Science has produced many mar-
vels for recording, reproducing and transmitting language. We
have dictating and transcribing machines, electric typewriters, tele-
6. Loevinger, Jurimetrics, 33 MIN. L. REv. 455 (1949).
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typewriters and radio telephones. However, science has not pro-
duced and does not yet promise to produce a mechanical secretary,
much less an author.
It is often said that science has transformed our lives. It is nec-
essary only to mention the machines that have been developed in
order to realize how fundamentally our living has been changed.
Think of the printing press, the railroad, the automobile, the air-
plane, electric generators and lights, the telegraph, the telephone,
radio, television and, perhaps, most momentous of all, the atomic
bomb.
However, it is not really the fact that these things have changed
our way of living. This is merely a figure of speech. In truth what
has happened is that we have changed our own lives in adaptation
to these machines, and their opportunities, their promises, and
their threats. It is neither reasonable nor realistic to expect the in-
vention of a machine that will do for us, only more rapidly and
with less human effort, the same thing that we have been doing
inefficiently for ourselves. Rather, what science offers us is tools
that will permit the same things to be done in a new way or
things to be done that could not have been attempted previously.
However, the utilization of both the mechanical and the intellec-
tual tools of science requires the adaptive effort of those who have
tasks to be performed. The applications of science to human af-
fairs are not self-executing. They require the activity and the ef-
fort of those who would secure the benefits-or detriments-of
the results. Instruments of communication are mute until man
gives them words. Means of transportation are stationary until
man guides them to their destination. histruments of observation
are useless until man employs the telescope to search the outer
reaches of the cosmos, or the miscroscope to examine the inner
crevices of the microcosmos.
Before we can employ any of the tools of science, we must first
understand them. Therefore, I suggest that the most promising
avenue of legal progress in the contemporary world is the path of
jurimetrics. This is the study of law and legal problems by scien-
tific methods and concepts, the employment of science in law to
the extent that it is applicable or adaptable.
The most useful and significant tools that science now offers
to law are intellectual rather than mechanical. These tools are nu-
merous, complex and subtle and, taken together, involve a range of
technical detail which probably exceeds the comprehension of any
single mind. However, there are certain basic concepts of science
which are of sufficient generality and significance to be both com-
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prehensible and important to all those concerned with the intellec-
tual foundations of any contemporary discipline. The first and
perhaps the most important of the basic concepts of science is that
of having realistic criteria of meaning. As Hans Reichenbach puts
it: "Statements about reality have sense only if they can be trans-
lated into statements about real things; the reference of the events
in the world to ideal entities of ghostly character, like an abso-
lute time moving along of itself, or an absolute space, is avoided
on principle."
7
Of course, scientific reality is not confined to tangible things.
Science deals also with abstract concepts. However, these too must
meet the criterion of realism. P. W. Bridgman, in a now classic
statement, has said:
In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of opera-
tions; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of opera-
tions. If the concept is physical, as of length, the operations are actual
physical operations, namely, those by which length is measured; or
if the concept is mental, as of mathematical continuity, the operations
are mental operations, namely those by which we determine whether
a given aggregate of magnitudes is continuous .... [A] consequence
of the operational character of our concepts . . . is that it is quite
possible, nay even disquietingly easy, to invent expressions or to ask
questions that are meaningless. It constitutes a great advance in our
critical attitude toward nature to realize that a great many of the ques-
tions that we uncritically ask are without meaning. If a specific ques-
tion has meaning, it must be possible to find operations by which an
answer may be given to it.... I believe that many of the questions
asked about social and philosophical subjects will be found to be mean-
ingless when examined from the point of view of operations. It
would doubtless conduce greatly to clarity of thought if the opera-
tional mode of thinking were adopted in all fields of inquiry as well
as in the physical. Just as in the physical domain, so in other domains,
one is making a significant statement about his subject in stating that
a certain question is meaningless.8
Thus, in any scientific view, a meaningful statement must be one
the truth and falsity of which entail different consequences that
are subject-at least in principle-to objective investigation.
A second basic concept of the scientific view is that of quantifi-
cation, the varieties of quantification, and the limits set to it by
the pervasive fact of indeterminacy. It is generally recognized that
science deals largely with numerical descriptions of phenomena.
However, it is not so generally understood that numbers may have
different meanings depending upon the manner in which they are
7. REICHENBACH, ATOM AND COSMOS 54 (1932).
8. BRmDGMAN, THE_ Loic OF MODERN PHYsics 5, 28-30 (1927).
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used. Ordinarily numbers are used to indicate measurement on an
interval scale. In the most obvious example, we measure space by
inches, meters or some other similar convenient unit. Although not
so simply measured, such things as time, weight, volume, speed
and temperature are also measured on interval scales. The differ-
ences between points on such scales separated by the same num-
ber of units is the same regardless of the position of these points
on the scale. Thus, the distance between the one inch and the
two inch mark on a foot rule is just the same as the distance from
the 11 inch to the 12 inch mark.
In contrast, we may also use scales that are similarly marked off
in numbers but on which the numbers indicate only the order of
occurrence and have no other quantitative significance. Perhaps
the most elegant example of this is a beauty contest in which a
number of superlatively attractive females may be rated as Num-
ber 1, Number 2, Number 3, and so forth, without any insinuation
that the differences in their pulchritudinous merits are measurable
other than by such a rank-order arrangement. This is an ordinal
scale. Such scales are used for measurements of skill, performance
and intangible qualities such as intelligence. A very simple ordinal
scale is used conventionally in the law for measuring the quantum
of evidence. Thus, in every lawsuit tried on factual issues, the court
must reach a determination that one side or the other has present-
ed the greater quantum of evidence, although no other quantita-
tive measure of the evidence is attempted.
A third type of scale, used for some special types of measure-
ment, is a ratio scale. The most common example of this is the
ordinary slide rule. An example of a practical application of the
ratio scale may be found in the logarithmic papers that are some-
times used for computing investment profits. To give a simple
illustration: if a security costing $2.00 increases two points in
price, going up to $4.00, the investor has doubled his investment.
On the other hand, if a security costing $100 goes up two points
in price to $102, the investor has made only two per cent profit
on his investment; and his security will have to increase 98 more
points to give him double his original investment.
The most important practical distinction to be noted here for
law is that between cardinal and ordinal numeration. When a
number is used to indicate the results of measurement on an inter-
val scale, as when height, weight, time or speed are indicated, it
has an altogether different significance than when it is used to in-
dicate position on an ordinal scale.
Another fact which frequently escapes notice in view of the fan-
19611
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tastic precision of which science is becoming capable in many
fields is that all measurements and quantitative determinations are
only approximate. Many measurements can be made with a degree
of precision that far exceeds any practical need or application.
Nevertheless, it remains true that there is an inescapable degree of
indeterminacy in all of our quantitative measurements. Further-
more, P. W. Bridgman adds,
[A]l experience seems to be of this character; we never have perfectly
clean-cut knowledge of anything, but all our experience is surrounded
by a twilight zone, a penumbra of uncertainty, into which we have
not yet penetrated .... It is a general consequence of the approximate
character of all measurement that no empirical science can ever make
exact statements. This was fairly obvious in the case of mechanics, but
it required a Gauss to convince us that the geometry in which we are
interested as physicists is an empirical subject, and that one cannot
say that actual space is Euclidean, but only that actual space approaches
to ideal Euclidean space within a certain degree of approximation.9
So, while the data of science are commonly expressed in mathe-
matical, frequently numerical, terms, they also commonly carry
their own indicia of indeterminacy. In order to understand this
language of science it is necessary to have at least some knowledge
of the elements of mathematics. The range of this subject is far
too great, and its nature too complex and profound, for cursory
discussion. It may, however, be pertinent to note that mathematics
is a language of extraordinary subtlety and expressiveness for
the statement of exceedingly general abstract concepts. As a lan-
guage, it has its own rules of grammar, syntax and internal opera-
tion. It is not in itself an empirical discipline; but it has become
the indispensable means by which we are able to test the consist-
ency of hypotheses with bodies of empirical data and with systems
of concepts, and to spin out the implications and consequences of
hypotheses.
The branch of mathematics that appears to be of the most im-
mediate practical utility in the fields of law and the behavioral
sciences is statistics. There is much in statistics that is of present
practical application in day-to-day legal problems and it has good
claim to be included in every law school curriculum.
The two conditions for the use of statistical methods are (1)
that we be dealing with numerical data, and (2) that we be deal-
ing with a universe of which we have either a complete census or
a representative sample. A valid sample of a universe requires
that there be either a completely random selection or that there
9. Id. at 33-34.
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be a purposively structured selection. In either case, the number in
the sample must be sufficiently large to insure that the sample is
representative of the universe in view of its mode of selection.
There are statistical techniques for determining the validity of
selection of a sample from a given universe.
The character of a universe can be determined from a valid
sample by statistical measures of central tendency and dispersion.
The most commonly used and understood measure of central
tendency is the average or the arithmetic mean. However, this is
frequently a very misleading index. There are many situations in
which it is more valid to use some other measure such as the
median, or the midpoint of the range, or the mode, which is the
most frequently occurring measure in the distribution. There are
other measures of central tendency, but these are of greater tech-
nical complexity and more specialized use.
The range of distribution is the simplest and most commonly
used measure of dispersion. However, like the arithmetic mean, it
is sometimes a misleading index. More significant measures may
be the standard deviation, which is the range that encompasses
two thirds of all the cases, or the mean deviation, which is the
average of deviations of the items in a distribution from their
arithmetic mean. There are also several other measures of disper-
sion which are of varying complexity and adapted to use in a va-
riety of situations.
One of the most important uses of statistics is the determina-
tion and expression of degrees of correlation. Correlation is a
measure of the relationship between two sets of values; as, for
example, between height and weight. It is commonly expressed
on a unitary numerical scale, on which zero indicates that the two
values occur independently ofeach other, lacking any correlation,
and 1 indicates that there is perfect correlation, so that a value in
either set will indicate the magnitude of a corresponding value in
the other set.
Correlation is closely related in logical analysis to the concepts
of causation and probability. Without becoming mired in the
philosophical and legal quagmire of causation, it may be noted
that there is some ground for supposing that the most satisfactory
view of causation is to regard it as a limiting case of correla-
tion.1" In any event, whether regarded as analytically separate
or related concepts, from a scientific viewpoint both correlation
10. See Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961),
and references cited in footnote 3 thereof.
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and causation are inseparably based upon some notion of prob-
ability.
One of the most fundamental, ubiquitous and useful conceptual
tools of modern science is the concept of probability. Indeed, it is
doubtful if one may pursue any contemporary inquiry beyond a
relatively superficial level without encountering or employing some
use of probability. On the other hand, despite the earnest inquiry
and often profound thought that has been given to the issue for
more than a century, there is not yet any single meaning that is
universally regarded as definitive of this concept. There are how-
ever, a number of views of the probability concept which may in-
dicate that it is used with some variety of meanings.
The most widely accepted scientific view of probability is a re-
finement of the classical formulation of Laplace, who defined
probability as the quotient obtained by dividing the number of
favorable cases by the number of equally possible cases.' The fre-
quency definition of probability avoids the reflexive character of
the classical definition inherent in the use of the term equal possi-
bility. The frequency definition of probability, sometimes called
the von Mises-Reichenbach definition, states that probability is
the frequency with which an event of a specified kind belonging to
a category of events occurs within a sequence of events of that
category.'2 For example, the probability of a coin coming up
heads or tails is defined as the relative number of times that the
coin comes up heads or tails in a series of events in which the
coin is tossed so that it may come up either heads or tails. By this
view, probability statements are objective, but they are meaningful
only if we can give a frequency interpretation of them, which re-
quires that all events as to which such a statement is made must be
instances of a class of similar events.
The obvious limitations of the frequency concept have led to at-
tempts to formulate alternative theories of probability. In sharpest
contrast to the objective definition is the subjective definition,
which states probability to be merely an expression of the degree
of confidence or doubt with which an assertion is made. The dif-
ficulty of attaching any numerical value to a subjective feeling,
as well as the other obvious objections to it as a term in public
discourse, have prevented this theory from securing much adher-
ence among logicians or scientists. Nevertheless, we must recog-
nize that this is the popular sense in which the term is most fre-
11. SIMON, MARQuIs DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBA-
BILITIES (1795).
12. MisEs, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH (1928); REICHENBACH,
EXPERIENCE AND PREDICTION (1938).
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quently used, and as such has considerable currency regardless of
logical justification.
The most sophisticated alternative to the objective theory of
probability is the logical proximity theory suggested by J. M.
Keynes13 and developed most recently by Rudolph Carnap.'4 By
this view, probability is a special kind of logical relation between
two statements. The extreme cases are. those of derivability and
contradiction. Between these limiting extremes, probability repre-
sents the degree of confirmation of the conclusion on the basis of
the evidence which we take as the premise. Carnap declares that
this concept is the foundation of all inductive reasoning, and has
undertaken to formulate what he claims to be a quantitative system
of inductive logic, or a means for specifying the degree of proba-
bility of the conclusion from nonquantitative evidence. I confess to
some difficulty with these efforts to quantify inference on the basis
of nonquantitative algebra, and find the proposal somewhat more
pretentious than productive. Nevertheless, there is at least a prom-
ise of plausibility in this theory, and it may be of significance to
those who work in an area in which the frequency theory inevita-
bly encounters great difficulty.
A fourth major alternative view of probability seeks to com-
bine the elements of the frequency and the logical proximity defini-
tions. This is the truth-frequency theory, which is the suggestion
of C. S. Peirce.1 5 The truth-frequency theory states that probabil-
ity is the frequency with which a proposition of a specified class is
true if there is as much evidence for it as there is for other propo-
sitions of that class. For example, suppose we take as the class those
judgments that have been established by proof "beyond a reason-
able doubt" (whatever that may mean). Let us further suppose
that we have established by past investigations that out of 100 cases
in which such a quantum of evidence has supported the judgment,
the judgment has been found to be true in 99 cases. It then fol-
lows that the probability of a judgment being true, if it belongs
to the class of judgments supported by evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt, is .99. Conversely, of course, this also means a prob-
ability that out of every 100 such judgments, one will be false.
The difficulty with this definition obviously is that it too may be
reflexive, in that most of the propositions for which we seek to give
such a probability value have nothing in common except the prob-
ability value assigned. But the difficulty is not theoretically ines-
capable and this is at least a potentially useful view of probability.
13. KEYNEs, A TREATIsE ON PROBABILITY (1921).
14. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF PROBABILITY (1950).
15. PEIRCE, CaANcE, LovE AND Looic (1923).
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Although it has generally escaped the notice of nonscientists, all
scientific conclusions are probability statements. Science reaches no
judgments or conclusions, and makes no predictions, except in
terms of probability. As Karl Popper has pointed out, since the
dimension of all probability statements is infinite, no experimental
results, however numerous or favorable, can firmly establish a
relative frequency. 6 In principle, therefore, probability statements
are neither strictly falsifiable nor verifiable and do not rule out
anything observable. However, as a practical matter, probability
statements may be utilized methodologically as if they were em-
pirically falsifiable and verifiable, and they are subject to varying
degrees of corroboration. The significance of this differentiation
between proof and corroboration is that empirical statements never
become fixed or absolute beyond further challenge or investiga-
tion. Thus, science remains an open system on both the theoretical
and thepractical level.
It is this characteristic which has accounted for most of the
scientific progress of the twentieth century. The new theories of
physical science have neither falsified nor supplanted classical
principles. Rather, they have shown that the classical principles
are not universal but valid only within limited spheres. The prin-
ciples of relativity and quantum physics are applicable in areas
beyond those to which Newtonian mechanics can be applied; and
it seems likely that if man continues his quest for understanding,
he may develop theories and principles that go beyond any of
those now known.
In science, as in law, the most practical applications of princi-
ples are those which enable us to make predictions. In this con-
nection, it is indispensable to note that the techniques of predic-
tion are the same as the techniques of analysis, which have been
summarily reviewed in the foregoing discussion. Analysis is nothing
more than the process of prediction applied to past events, or what
one may call postdiction. Prediction, on the other hand, involves
interpolation or extrapolation from an analysis. There is no objec-
tive way of validating an analysis except by extending it to an
unknown case by prediction or postdiction and then determining
the degree to which observation corroborates it. Thus, regardless of
its character, any valid analysis can be utilized for purposes of
prediction; and there can be no such thing as prediction except as
it is based upon an analysis of the phenomena involved. Further-
more, every prediction with any pretension to scientific validity or
foundation, is simply a probability statement.
16. POPPER, THE LOGIC 01' SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 189 (1959).
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This raises the problem that has caused almost as much diffi-
culty as the definition of probability itself. The problem is: what
is the meaning of probability as applied to the instance of a single
case? It is the general view that the frequency theory of probability
is simply inapplicable to the instance of the single case. This is
not, as sometimes assumed, because the single case is unique or
because it is not capable of replication. Uniqueness is simply a
matter of degree and is not a categorical distinction of any case
with which we deal. Every case is unique in some aspect; but no
case that we are capable of considering or discussing is wholly
unique, or we would have no means of either conceiving or dis-
cussing it. Neither is the impossibility of replication the objection
to application of frequency probability to the single case. A fre-
quency probability judgment is as inapplicable to the single toss of
a coin as it is to the prediction of a single lawsuit. Obviously, the
toss of a coin can be replicated; and, indeed, coin tossing as a class
of events is the classic example of frequency probability. The
difficulty has been that it is impossible to give a rigorously logical
meaning to a frequency probability prediction about a single event,
such as the toss of a coin or an individual lawsuit.
It seems to me that this logical dilemma suggests that the term
probability may be used in different senses in different situa-
tions. From the operational viewpoint, probability obviously means
the operations by which we derive a particular probability value.
Ordinarily, these will be the observation and counting of past
cases. However, when we are seeking to predict the results of a
single future case, what we are apparently attempting to invoke is
a degree of confidence as a basis for action. In any event, we can
and do rely upon probability judgments in predicting the outcome
of single cases, and such reliance is justified by the criterion of
success. It may well be that we can convert a probability state-
ment derived from the frequency of occurrence of past events to a
probability statement applicable to future events with a truth-fre-
quency significance. This would avoid the theoretical difficulty of
applying a probability judgment to a unique case by synthesizing
a category for every case. Each case, regardless of its other char-
acteristics, would then belong to the category of other cases having
an equal probability value.
When we seek to apply these principles to the problems of le-
gal prediction, a few more observations must be made. To begin
with, we must recognize that legal prediction is an activity in
which lawyers, and for that matter citizens in all occupations, are
commonly engaged. The effort is obviously not uniformly success-
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ful and there are inconsistencies and failures both for lawyers
and for citizens in every variety of situation. Nevertheless, there are
also notable successes and, as Karl Llewellyn has recently point-
ed out, the common law tradition supplies a good many elements
of stability to the framework within which legal prediction is or-
dinarily made.' The question, therefore, becomes whether the
data and methods of science can add anything substantial to the
art of legal prediction as presently known and practiced by those
learned in the law.
It should be noted that the function of legal prediction normal-
ly takes the facts of the case as premises which are given, and con-
siders only the problem of determining law in such a context. Of
course, this is a great oversimplification of the actual problem. The
determination of facts in a case is ordinarily the controlling func-
tion. It is frequently true that a relatively small difference in find-
ing or viewing the facts will be the determinative point in the ap-
plication of differing legal principles. Much, and perhaps most,
of the uncertainty in legal prediction arises from the inability to
forecast what the facts will be, or what the courts will infer them
to be from the evidence, or even what the evidence will be upon
trial. Further, it must be kept in mind that the courts never know
the facts of any case, and lawyers seldom do. Courts and lawyers
alike are ordinarily limited to a knowledge of the evidence which
is, at best, a partial and not altogether accurate indication of what
the facts are.'"
The issues of fact determination are still empirical problems
which are essentially the same as those with which science deals
in other fields. In the area of fact determination, the law has al-
ready adopted many of the techniques and data of science. Modern
crime detection services, such as the FBI, utilize highly developed
scientific laboratories in which all of the physical and biological
sciences are employed in the detection of crime and the identifica-
tion of criminals. Medical science is, of course, employed exten-
sively and habitually by the law in matters involving personal in-
jury and similar factual issues. The physical sciences are also em-
ployed in the testing and identification of questioned documents.
The physical sciences are utilized, both practically and theoretical-
ly, in determining such matters as the speed of vehicles, braking
distances and the force and direction of impact in collisions. Science
has been less successful in developing techniques for testing the
17. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
18. Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 154
(1958), reprinted in HENSON, LANDMARKS OF LAW 422 (1960).
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truthfulness and reliability of testimony, and the law has been
much more skeptical of the techniques that have been developed.
Nevertheless, a significant amount of work has been done in the
field of the detection of testimonial deception, and the establish-
ment of legally acceptable techniques in this field appears to be
only a matter of time. Considerably less has been done in the field
of developing methods of testing testimonial reliability. This ap-
pears to be a problem which should challenge both the legal schol-
ar and the psychologist, and it may be hoped that their joint ef-
fort will produce some useful results within the next few years. In
addition to the reliance upon numerous scientific techniques, the
law has made great strides in its own procedure for fact determi-
nation, principally in the numerous devices for pretrial discovery
of evidence. All of these together have, to some extent, made
determination of the evidence in a case much more predictable.
But, despite the adoption of all these devices, it still remains
true that the determination of facts is the greatest single element
of uncertainty in the overwhelming majority of cases. In those situ-
ations in which prediction is attempted while the facts are still
wholly or partially prospective the difficulty is that the facts which
actually develop may not correspond altogether with those that
were postulated; and, even if they do, the evidence finally adduced
in court may not indicate this to the judge or jury. Where the facts
are already matters of history, there are most commonly great dif-
ferences in the views taken of them by different parties, and evi-
dence is notoriously unpredictable.
The one point that is inescapable is that some method of legal
prediction is indispensable. Legal predictions are constantly being
made and must be acted upon. There is no man in business to-
day who does not depend largely upon either explicit or implicit
legal predictions in much of what he does. In this day of increas-
ingly complex laws and regulations, the ability of even the ordi-
nary citizen without a business of his own to live a happy and se-
cure life and to stay out of jail depends upon his ability to make
at least some legal predictions. Therefore, we must do the best
we can with this problem and it is incumbent upon the legal pro-
fession to develop and utilize the best methods possible for the
making of the most rational legal predictions.
To this end jurimetrics, or the employment of science in law,
now offers great help. While the study itself has not yet been fairly
initiated, from what we know already of science some conclusions
can be ventured.
To begin with we must be clear that science offers us neither
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ultimate nor certain answers to legal problems. The dream that
science might some day tell us which of several competing inter-
ests is the more important is a vain one. Science essays no such
answers in any field. Science does not assign social or ethical values.
Science may, indeed, provide data from which social or ethical
judgments may be made; but the judgments will remain with
man. Further, even as to the data and the principles which science
may offer us, there will be no certainty. The data of science are
stated in statistical terms and probabilities, and absolutes or cer-
tainties are, if nothing else, unscientific.
However, the indeterminacy and uncertainty of scientific data
and principles are not to be taken as an impeachment of their
validity or worth. On the contrary, these are intrinsic guaranties
that the data and their validity are precisely as represented and are
not overstated. These serve also to remind us that all human
knowledge and experience is similarly uncertain, and indeterminate
to a degree. We do not escape from the indeterminacy and un-
certainty of science by postulating categorical absolutes. We mere-
ly deceive ourselves into supposing that we are wiser than we are,
and court the possibility of error by overlooking the limitations
of our knowledge and the extent of our ignorance.
The most promising immediate contribution that science pro-
poses to make to the law is in automatic information retrieval.
Within the last few years there has been an almost explosive de-
velopment in the scientific methods of data retrieval. We now
have available techniques of storing and retrieving data on punch
cards, on peek-a-boo cards, on capacitor punched sheets, on mi-
crofilm, on micro-cards, on magnetic tape, magnetic discs or mag-
netic cards, on thermoplastic tape recorded by electron beams,
as well as techniques for providing the continuous radio transmis-
sion of a body of data, and techniques of paging or identification
systems for ordinary books or cards. Beyond the systems already
in use or under development, experimentation in solid state elec-
tronics and utilization of radioactive isotopes, promises new and
even more revolutionary developments.
While most of the systems that have been developed or design-
ed so far involve substantial expense and rather elaborate ma-
chinery for utilization, even that obstacle to widespread use has
already been virtually eliminated by other technical developments.
It is now commonplace to transmit data directly from one elec-
tronic computing machine to another by telephone cable. When
(and I do not say if) adequate facilities for electronic data stor-
age and retrieval are developed for legal use, it is foreseeable that
[Vol. 46:255270
JURIMETRICS
there need be only a few such facilities in relatively large areas.
Private law offices may well be equipped with coding and decod-
ing machines that are little larger or more complex than an elec-
tric typewriter, and which can be connected directly to a telephone
line. In order to utilize the data stored in an electronic computer
at some central location it will then be necessary only for the law
office to call the central research facility, much as the library might
be called by telephone today, and to have the office coding ma-
chine attached directly to the central computer by way of the tele-
phone cable. In this manner a lawyer in any part of the coun-
try might undertake a direct research project in any law center
equipped with the appropriate electronic equipment. While this
may require more numerous or complex telephone lines than are
now in service, the increase will be by no means proportionate to
the additional utilization of the central research facilities. Auto-
matic electronic searching, reporting and recording of data is so
incredibly much faster than any other known means of handling
similar data that only seconds will be required to complete what
now takes hours of time by telephone conversation.
Actually the hardware-the mechanical devices-for permit-
ting just such handling of legal data is already in existence. What
is lacking is an adequate means of coding, indexing and retrieving
the data that are to be handled. The software-the design of sys-
tems for utilizing the hardware-is what is now required. This
involves an understanding of the intellectual instruments of science
that have been referred to, plus an ability to employ these tools
and improvise applications.
Considerable experimentation is now going on in a number of
places with respect to the problems of coding and retrieving legal
data by electronic means. One thing is already apparent. That is
that present methods of digesting and classifying legal data are in-
adequate. There are a number of reasons for this. Perhaps the
principal one is that the hierarchical method of classification upon
which our present digesting and indexing system is built is es-
sentially a closed end system which becomes too cumbersome
when the material with which it deals expands as rapidly in quan-
tity and variety as precedents, laws and regulations have in recent
decades. Other defects are that the hierarchical system of classifi-
cation is relatively inflexible and, therefore, adapts poorly to new
subjects and new concepts. The digest itself necessarily depends
upon the ability and insight of the person doing the abstracting
as well as the one doing the searching. Therefore, any lawyer is
subject to frustration in his legal research if the abstractor lacks
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skill, insight or imagination. In any event the task of abstracting
and classifying is an immensely detailed and difficult one which
may be quite unnecessary.
An alternative to the hierarchical classificatory system of index-
ing and digesting is a co-ordinate system in which data are iden-
tified either by concepts or by key terms, and located and retrieved
by the coincidence of concepts or key terms used as co-ordinates.
It is at least theoretically possible that the data in such a system
might be stored in random order, except for classification by ju-
risdiction and the chronological sequence that will result from re-
cording material as it is received. It is also possible that data so
recorded and indexed need not be digested. It is quite possible
that the coding may be done automatically by electronic optical
scanning of the text and identification of words or phrases, either
on the basis of frequency of occurrence, or of a predetermined list
of significant words, or of both. It is further entirely possible that
all of the recorded data, perhaps comprising even as much as all
recorded American decisions to date, might be scanned completely
in a few seconds of time, and all those containing specified words
or phrases would be transmitted over a telephone line and printed
in form for use so quickly as to be instantaneous by present tem-
poral standards of legal research.
The advantages of such a system are so obvious as hardly to
need detailing. To begin with, it is apparent that any such system
could handle vastly more data in a fashion useful to lawyers than
any presently existing system. One of the reasons that the volume
of data usefully recorded would be much larger is not merely that
it can be recorded in less bulky fashion, but also that it can be
retrieved more quickly and identified more specifically and cer-
tainly by narrower, more numerous and more specific coding sig-
nals. Furthermore, the method of indexing, coding and retrieving
need not be firmly established at the time the data are recorded.
If the system is adequately designed initially, it would be quite
possible to utilize combinations of terms, or co-ordinates, for the
retrieval of data that were not conceived or utilized at the time the
data were originally stored.
In this fashion the promise of modern scientific method is that it
may free legal thinking from its bondage to established hierarchical
systems of classification, while still permitting utilization of the
common law method of decision by precedent. It is not too much to
hope that electronic retrieval of data may give the common law a
vitality and flexibility quite beyond the conception of lawyers of
an earlier era. Further, it is not merely the common law case pre-
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cedents that may be made readily available to the lawyers of the
future. The system of electronic data retrieval should be equally
applicable to statutes, administrative regulations and decisions, and
eventually, to relevant data from other fields including the behav-
ioral and the physical sciences. Thus, the limitations that are now
put upon decision making by the sheer physical problem of search-
ing out all of the potentially relevant data from legal and scientific
sources may be largely eliminated.
As this frees decision making from the limitations of present
facilities and methods, so will it also make legal prediction more
reliable and secure. At the same time, the application of mathe-
matical techniques of analysis and synthesis both to legal data and
to specific factual situations, should permit the development of a
calculus of legal prediction that will be of considerable assistance
in establishing probability statements for the determination of spe-
cific legal issues.
It is impossible to say with any degree of assurance precisely
how the art of legal prediction will be practiced with such develop-
ments. But at least the possibilities are evident. In the imminent
future when jurimetrics has become a practiced discipline, when
legal data become encoded, stored and retrieved electronically, and
when lawyers have learned to cope with the mechanical and in-
tellectual tools of science, the situation giving rise to legal questions
will still, as now, be analyzed by a lawyer. Then, however, the
crucial factual aspects may be reducible to a number of elements
or factors.1 9 These, in turn, may be quantified on an ordinal scale
that has been constructed from statistical analyses of corresponding
factors in previous cases. A mathematical description, or profile, of
the case may then be constructed. On the basis of this, the most
closely analogous precedents will be retrieved from the electronic
library in which reports are stored. These may then be analyzed
electronically by computer techniques to establish the degree of
coherence (i.e., central tendency) and inconsistency (i.e., disper-
sion) among the precedents, the correspondence (i.e., correlation)
between the instant case and the sets of precedents, and the prob-
ability that the result of litigation will be that sought. The product
will be a scientific prediction, stated in probability terms, and
resting upon the validity of the analytical and statistical techniques
applied to the underlying data. The proper interpretation and ap-
19. See LOEVINGER, The Element of Predictability in Judicial Decision
Making, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND
ELECTRONICS, U.C.L.A. 1960; Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions
Mathematically, 51 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 1 (1957); SCEuBERT, QUANTITA-
TVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICiAL BEHAvIOR (1959).
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plication of such a prediction will require an understanding by the
lawyer of the scientific techniques and concepts involved, just as
diagnosis and prediction in fields now served by science requires a
similar understanding.
There is no prospect of any process that will preclude consider-
ation of social desirability or wisdom. The opportunity will always
be available to argue that precedent should not be followed, and
that considerations of policy, or expediency, require a different
rule or a special result. Such arguments will be neither precluded
nor determined by the more complete analysis and retrieval of
data that science will afford. These advantages may not even stimu-
late the exercise of more thought or greater wisdom. But they will
at least permit these, if we are inclined to make the effort entailed.
The devices of science are more than new gadgets. They are entire-
ly novel methods of manipulating recorded information that are
as great an advance beyond present library techniques as printed
books were beyond manuscripts. The intellectual instruments of
scientific conceptualization are, within their sphere, similarly pow-
erful new tools to extend the reach of the human mind. The effect
of these mechanical and intellectual instruments depends en-
tirely upon the use to which they are put.
It is important to keep in mind what it is that science promises
and what it does not offer. Science does not and will not offer us
any law machines that give automatic answers to specific ques-
tions put to them, whether as to particular cases or as to ultimate
legal issues such as the relative importance of interests that may
be in conflict. By the same token, science will provide us with no
formulae or calculus that will give us certainty either of prediction,
analysis or answers to ultimate questions such as which interest
is to be preferred or which desire has greater social value. As with
the printing press, the automobile, the electric light and the tele-
phone, electronic data retrieval promises nothing more than cer-
tain new tools which we may use as well or as poorly as we are
willing to make the effort.
On the other hand it is important to recognize that science does
now, with the new wonders of electronics and data manipulation,
offer us new tools that are potentially at least as powerful as the
printing press, the automobile, the electric light and the telephone.
It will require considerable effort on the part of the legal profes-
sion, first, to develop an effective vocabulary, taxonomy and logic
fully to utilize these new instruments, and then to insure that the
new developments are taught to the profession so that they may
be generally employed. However, the legal profession probably has
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no choice. If it is to retain its position of intellectual leadership it
must meet and master this great new intellectual challenge. If it
does, it may find itself freed to lead society in advances that none
of us now can envision. However, as we struggle to adapt the tra-
ditions and institutions of man's oldest discipline to the emerging
and evolving miracles of man's newest intellectual achievements,
we must keep in mind that it is not the machines that have chang-
ed mens' lives but the adaptions that men themselves have adopt-
ed in response to the machines. It is not the invention of tools,
however subtle, complex or powerful, that constitutes man's great-
est achievement, but the skill in using the tools that man has de-
veloped in himself.

